MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OFnd B,: "MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES ANDated1
The United States Intelligence Board has recently approved aol estimates on Soviet capabilities and policies, in order to provideeries of relatively short, topical estimates on these subjects, to be issued at intervals over the coming months. The new series will replace the compendium on the USSR, formerly scheduled annually asMain Trends in sovietandn accordance with this rescheduling, there will be no full text Issuance of.
To insure that up-to-date, coordinated statements are available on Soviet military forces, the United States Intelligence Board has reviewed recenton this subject and has prepared the attached paragraphs on selected developments of major significance. These paragraphs supplement theIn, Annex A, "Soviet Military Forces andatedhere appropriate, they also contain numerical estimates superseding those in the Tables appearing Innd B. In cases where estimates Issued subsequent to1 contain judgments supplementing or modifying the Annexes to, cross-references to these more recent Issuances are provided.
JOHN A. McCONE.
Director
ET
APR 9
TOP
SELECTED DEVELOPMENTS OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE TO SOVIET MILITARY FORCES AND CAPABILITIES
in rhe Size ond Composition ol the Soviet Armed Forces
{Sec. Annex A,)
The total number of men under arms inSR has been Increased sinceevel which we believe approximates the strength maintained prior to the militaryand personnel reductionsby Khrushchev in0eriod of reductions and0 and possibly the early monthsotal personnel strength intood at approximately three million men. This reflected the completion of about half the cut which the Soviets originally announced would reduce their armed forces fromoillion men by the endn the summer and tallthe Soviet Government announced that it had suspended further reductions and would retain certain conscripts beyond their normal terms of service: other Information indicates that. In addition, selected reservists were recalled to active duty. At the same time, the regular antfual Induction of new conscripts has occurred on schedule. As nwe estimate that the personnel strength of the Soviet armed force* ha* Increased lo approximatelyillion men as. not counting militarised security forces numbering.
In general, we believe that most of thepersonnel have been used to fill outcombat and support units and losome units which were originallyfor deactivation. Because information on the manning of Soviet military unitspiecemeal over an extended period, no new breakdown of strength by component ciin be given at this time. However, wethat the primary effect has almostbeen on ground elements of the theater field forces, which probably now haveine divisions and increased nor.dlvisional support. The retirement of older air and naval equipment has probably been slowed down and ln some cases hailed. By these measures, we believe that the USSR Uground, air, and naval forces at levels higher than originally planned while at the same time proceeding with the planned ex-paniJon of capabilities with advanced weapon system*.
changes In personnel policy haveby Soviet spokesmen aspending solution of the Berlinand they are portrayed in Sovietas reactions to increases in USUSSR Is thus publicly leavingubsequent reduction inWe continue to believeeconomic, political, andconsiderations will probably causeleaders torogram ofwhenever in their view theoutlook makes this feasible.any such decisionime advantageous toand foreign policy.manning levels and the retentionpersonnel contribute to increasedreadiness of the Soviet forces.
Soviet Military Expenditures
(See, Annex A,)
the past six months, the Sovietstwo substantial Increases Inallocated to the1 Khrushchev announced thatallocation for that year was being
TOP
fromillion newriginally planned4 billion rubles. In Ihe annual budget announcement of early December, planned military expenditures2 were set4 billion rubles, moreillion rubles orercent greater than the1 allocation. The announcements themselvesarge propagandacalculated lo show publicly that the USSR is determined totrongfoundation for its current foreign policy and lo convey the impression that it will match Increases in US military spending.
ighly unlikely that the full amount ofillion ruble Increase announced1 could actually have been spent in that year as claimed. It is likely that the bulk of the increase was achieved by transferring to the overt military category certainwhich had previously been hidden in other categories of the Soviet budgetin the budget2 there are unusual decreases totaling three or more billion rubles in these other categories.
esult of the accounting changesby theseuch larger part of total Soviet millxpenditure now appears to be Included In the overt military category, but we continue to believe that real military costs are larger than those explicitly allocated to defense In the published budget. Based cn our estimates of actual Sovietprograming, we believe that these real costs were nearlyillion rublesnd that they will Increase tohis estimated increaseretention through the coming year of 3Vi million military personnel and takesof likely increases in allocations to long-range attack and air defense forces, and to military research and development. Some additional increase may be Incurred bytraining activities and otherto increase the readiness of existingforces. Because the Soviet economyhole Is expanding, however, actual military expenditures2 will probably continue to comprise on the order of one-tenth of gross national product when measured ln ruble terms.
the available data, we are able toslightly more than two-third* ofspending among the followingtheater operations, includingtactical air; air defense; long-rangeand naval missions. We nowallocations to theater operations2 as previously expected,they will continue to absorb nearlyof total Soviet militaryon forces for air defenseattack will each probablysomewhat under to somewhat overof total military spending, andon forces for naval missionsremain at roughlyercent.part of the unapportioned residualresearch and development.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 1
{See,
Mid-IS 62
e estimated thatICBM strength, then ln the range ofwould probably notew, secondsystem was ready for operationalin the latter halfandem-stagedsmaller than the firstICBM and using storable liquid pro-
TOPRET
was under intensive development on the Tyuratam test rangeevidence and analysis indicates that the Soviets have made somewhat more rapid progress than we had estimated in developing their second generation ICBM. The ICBM tests into the Pacific ln Septemberncluded successful tests of the new system to. range. It has also become apparentn this ICBMwas aided by development work on an IRBM system which employes similar design concepts and components. Finally, ouron Soviet construction ofcomplexes with road-served launchers suitable for the second generation ICBMleads us to believe that some such launchers are now ready to receive missiles
these reasons, we now estimate thatwill probably achieve an initialcapability (IOC) with their secondICBM system during the first halfInhe USSR willa totalaunchers fromcan be fired against the US,at first and second generationlaunching complexes ln the fieldaunchers at Tyuratam.
six-month advance ln estimateddocs not necessarilyirectthe number ol operational launcherswin have inf It reflectsin the Sovietmerelyestimate ofmay mean only thataspects of the second generationhave made up for lost time andIn proper phase with the preparationlaunching complexes.the intensityinformation on launch complexesunder construction, the teadliracsfor their activation, and theof unidentified complexes underwc now believe that the actualof operational ICBM launchers inis likely to fall toward the highange which we estimated forlast September. Additional evidence, and reanalysis to be undertaken lnfor the forthcoming.urther change in these estimated numerical ranges.
or general trends In numbers ofICBM launchers4ogether with the factors likely to affect Soviet ICBM deployment concepts In this period, secThe Soviet Strategicatedor estimates of the strength and deployment of Soviet ballistic missiles of medium and intermediate ranges, see, "Strength and Deployment of Soviet Long-Range Ballistic Missileated
lono Rcnge Avio'loo
(Seennex A.)
Ine estimated Soviet Long Range Aviation strength in heavy bombers and tankers atISON jet andEAR turboprop aircraft as ofndradual decline In the heavy bomber force over the next five years. It has been established that over about the pastonths two additional regiments have been activated at Soviet heavy bomberadditional aircraft have been assigned to units at these airfields, and flying activity has intensified This is particularlyln the case of units containing BEAR bombers-ompleteof evidence on Soviet heavy bombers has been made.
On the basis of this review, we believe that the production of BISON bombers and tankers continuedery low rate until about the middlend that thisprogram has probably now ceased. Total production of BISONs was probably;ISONs are now lnunils.'
TOP4^RET
Production of BEARs. on the other hand, is less certain. We believeotalere produced and that It is unlikely that any new BEAR bombers haveontinued activity at the BEAR factory is probably accounted for by production of the CLEAT transpoit and by two consecutive major modifications ofBEARs, the first to correct defects in the aircraft and the second to fit them forof air-to-surface missiles. Theactivity at BEAR bases, together with some other bits of evidence, can be interpreted io mean that production continued and that there are somewhat larger numbers of BEARs in operational units than we have estimated. However, it Is much more likely that theunit activity results from theto BEAR bases of additional BADGER jet medium bombers in aboutome number of BADGERS has always been present in Soviet heavy bomber units, apparently to perform ECM, decoy, and other supporting missions in conjunction with heavy bomber strikes. We therefore continue to estimate that the most probable number of BEARs in operational unit*ut do not exclude the possibilityew additional BEARs in units at the present time.1 *
Present Soviet strength In BISONs and BEARs will probably be maintainedear or so and then decline graduallyesult of normal attrition. There continues to be no good evidenceoviet intention to series produce the BOUNDER or any other follow-on heavy bomber, although research and development In new heavy bomberscontinues. Thereossibilityew such aircraft will be in units in thebout half of the BEAR force has now been modified toir-tosurface missiles for standoffon land targets, and we believe thatall operational BEARs will have been so modified byhere is no evidence that BISONs have been equipped for air-to-surface missile delivery.
BADGER medium bomber strength In Long Range Aviation was reduced byircraft In the last two years. It will probably continue to decline, but by theonsiderable portion of the medium bomber force Is likely to be supersonic "dash" BLINDERs, some of them probably equipped for standoff missile delivery. Although the evidence is inconclusive, we believe that BLINDERs are now beginning to enterunits
The Uble below projects the trends In Long Range Aviation over the next five years, on our assumptions that the Soviets make no drastic policy changes and that the forceto comprise presently-known aircraft types. In addition to the medium bombers shown ln the table, the USSR now hasuch aircraft in Naval Aviation and will probably haven thea, the bulk of them BADGERs but probablysome BLINDERs.
The Assistant Chief of Stan.F. believes, In consideration of continued Sovietand development In new bombers and other relevant factors, that the USSR will probablya new heavy bomber into the
et
*r
B
Strength of Soviet Long Range Aviation
1Mid Mid- Mid- Mid-3 2 3 4 S 6
BISON*
..
Bombers
few
...
Bombers'
and BADGER figures include aircraft Qttcd aa tankers. These are available in all BISON tniu and In aboutercent of the BADGER units They can probably be reconverted to bombing useew hours.
irtually all BEARS will probably have been modified to carry and. alr-Uvaurlace missiles rather than bombs
BUNDERs will probably be equippedew air-lo-surface missile We have no present evidenceLINDER tanker; modified HA DO EH and BISON tankers could probably perform this function.
'Does not Include medium bombers assigned to Naval Aviation.
Assistant Chief of Btalt. Intelligence. USAF. believe* that the number* of heavy bomber* should read:
1 Mid- Mid- Mid. Mid. 4 5 0
Tactical Aviation
(See. Annex A,)
observation ofovietpracticing low altitudebombing maneuvers in Easttogether with other evidence,previous belief that the Soviets haveatomic delivery capability.
Nuclear Submarines and Submorine-Launched Missiles
(See, Annex A,)
is still not possible to statethat the USSR has any nuclearat all. However, thea substantial body of evidence, takenwith the statements of Sovietus to the estimatehe Soviet fleet are nuclearof these are believed to be theissile submarines, and theare "N" class torpedo attackWe believeonstruction8uclear submarines per year canachieved and that the Soviets willbuild them at thishis estimate is basedevidence of Soviet nuclearand operations, theof the two Soviet shipyardsto be engaged in nuclear submarineand the estimated Soviet capabilitynuclear reactors. It is possible thatthe next five years the Soviets willnuclear subrnarine effort, but welimitations on Soviet reactorwell as the time required to develop lm-
Assistant Chief ol Slaff, Intelligence. USAF. lurlhir believes that, with these numbers ofln Long Range Aviation, and Inof pertinentactor* (excluding combat attrition i. the USSR could putomber* over North America on two-way missions in an initial attack. Moreover, he estimatea thataximum effort, again not consideringattrition, and employing; one and two-way missions, over SOD bomber* could reach Urgvt* In North America. (See pagearagraphl
-*?
submarine types from earlier classes, would lend to limit the annual building rate
here is evidence that missiles ofthe same type are carried by allSoviet ballistic missileincluding the seven conventionally-powered 'Z-conversion" andO" class units as well as the eight nuclear-powered "H" class submarines. These missiles arc believed capable of delivering nuclear warheads in the low megaton range to distances of up to.EP. against land targets under operational conditions.can probably be launched only while the submarine Is surfaced. Theresently-operational ballistic missile submarines carry two or three missiles each, depending on their class, and the total complement of all these submarines is aboutissiles. Available evidence indicates that these submarines are also equipped for torpedo attack.
ecause of the technical difficultiesagainst the likelihood of submerged launch of the present missile system, andof the complete absence of evidence of current Soviet workubmarine system lor submerged launching of longer range ballistic missiles, wc now estimate4 is the earliest date at which the USSR could achieveystem. Indeed, the chances seem about even that the Soviets will regard present systems as satisfactory for some years touccessor to the "II" class, if it appears, couldoremissile system with some six missiles per submarine.
he majority of nuclear submarinesto date have been ballistic missile types.
However, we believe that the Soviets willmore nuclear-powered torpedofor various purposes, Including the Interdiction of sea lines of communication,on naval surface forces at sea, andwarfare. In the future, somesubmarines may be equipped with missiles suitable for use against surface ships and submarines.
In the table below, the estimated totals represent our best judgment regarding the construction of nuclear submarines of all types. On the basis of classes identified to dote, they are shown In two categories: ballistic missile and torpedo attack. This allocation Is believed generally valid for the next year or so, but beyond that point, asin the preceding paragraphs, the totals maylass with antishlplass with more sophisticated ballisticor both. We cannot now estimate the magnitude of such programs, nor can wcwhich of the identified classes will be affected.
In addition to the nuclear-poweredprograms described above, there isevidence pointingrogram to equip conventional submarines with cruise-typeithin the past year,"W" class submarines equipped with cylinders or tubes suitable for carrying missiles have been observed in three of the four Soviet Fleet areas, and there Is evidence that at least two important shipyards are involved in modifying these submarines. Moreover, we believe that the USSR hasa cruise-type missile with homing guidancepeed of about Mach I, de-
Soviot Strength in Nucloor-Powered Submarines'
I Jen-
Ballliric Missile" wid/or successor classes! Torpedo Attack Submarinesand/or successor classes)
TOTAL
12
Mld-
USAF, to
is.
signed to fly,ew thousand feet altitude and capable of carrying aofounds. While the direct association of these developments cannot be established at this time, we estimate that some "W" class cruise-type missile submarines are probably now operational. Additionalof this class may be similarlyover the next fiveew class of conventional submarines designed specifically for this purpose may also be under
he new information on thesetends to clarify the missions of Soviet missile submarines. Because of theirranges. "W" class submarines equipped wilh cruise-type missiles are suited primarily for operations against surface ships In the North Atlantic and Western Pacific, whereas missile submarines of thendclasses have sufficient range to operate In US coastal waters and their ballistic missiles arc designed for employment against fixed targets, ln an Artillery Day pronouncementoviet naval spokesman clearly distinguished between the navy'smissiles, described as "basically assigned to the destruction of coastalnd its "self-homing" missiles, described as the "most effective means" of destroying ships, especially aircraft carriers. We continue to believe that the Soviets regard submarine-launchedmissiles as supplementing other means of nuclear attack aga.tnst the US. The cruise-type missile program, together with the program to equip naval BADGER aircraft with antiship missiles.ontinuing major Soviet effort to counter Westernnaval capabilities, especially carrier strike forces,
Defense Against Bollii'ie Missiles
(See. Annex A, paragraph 4)
he Soviets have made further progressn systems to defend against ballistic missiles, especially in the recent nuclear test scries. During that series, three tesls were conducted at high altitudes: one ofT. detonatedeet, and two of low yield, detonated at. In the latter tests, the nuclear devices werecarried. ballistic missiles fired from Kapusiin Yar toward the Sary Shagan antimissile research center. The tests were probably designed to determine the ability of antimissile system radars to track incoming ballistic missiles, and possiblymissiles as well. In the presence of debris and Ionization from nuclear bursts Although these tests probably were notantimissile system tests, they contributed valuable effects Information to the antimissile development program.
Our evidence is still insufficient lowhether or not the Soviets haveconducted firings against incoming ballistic missiles, but we believe It likely that they have done soumber of occasions over the past year. Nor can we determine the method the Soviets have chosen tothe complex tasks of detection,discriramation, and tracking necessary to successful solution of the InterceptWe know, however, that they areon terminal Intercept techniques, and their RAD interest apparently includes techniques for Interception both inside and outside the atmosphere.
While many uncertainties remain as to the role of the electronic installations at the Sary Shagan antimissile research center, we believe that the great number and variety of these installations represent Sovietof more than one type of antimissile system. In addition to defense against IRBMs and ICBMs,K is probablysystems to cope with other types of Western ballistic missiles. For defense against free rockets and short-range ballistic missiles, the Soviets can probably achieve some capability by modifying their surface-to-air missile system designed for use against aircraft. Considering the years of experience in antimissile research at Sary Shagan, the intensity of the Soviet program there, and the availability of antiaircraft systems such as thee believe that the USSR could probably achieve an IOC against tacticalwith ranges up to about. An entirely new system would prob-
TO
bly be required to defend against Western act leal missiles of longer ranges. Wc believe hatystem is under development at iary Shagan. and that It is designed to de-end Soviet targets, including those of theater leld forces, against ballistic missiles with anges of roughly. An IOC ?ould probably be achieved.
Considering the status of therogram and the political and military idvantages of early deploymentystemefend against IRBMs and ICBMs, wc have iitlmated that the USSR will begin at least limited deployment ofystem. Lead times of some two to three years are probably required for the construction and installation of radars and other systemin the vicinity of targets to beand we have not yet identified any such activities. Deployment activities might go undetectedonsiderable time after their Initiation, however, and al present we do not regard the lack of evidence asa change in the estimated IOC date.
Recenl Soviet Nucieor Tein
(See, Annex A,)
ummary of conclusions drawn from the recent Soviet test series, based on pre-lirnlnary analysis, seeThe Soviet Strategic Militaryatedoreanalysis, see the forthcoming, "The Soviet Atomic Energynow scheduled for completion In February or
ET
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: